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Translation 
 
Sarah Maitland 
 
Cielos, / hoy se ha de ver en mi casa / no más de vuestro castigo. 
 
– El castigo sin venganza 
 
In the opening scene of El castigo sin venganza the Duke of Ferrara is in disguise. So soon 
before his wedding to Casandra, and despite the rumours of his debauchery, it is imperative 
that his hunt for female entertainment goes unnoticed. His position requires him to take a 
wife; in so doing, he ensures justice for the people by avoiding civil war. Yet by denying his 
freedom-loving nature, he must do injustice to himself. When he learns of Casandra’s affair 
with his son Federico, rather than make their adultery public he contrives her death at 
Federico’s own hand. What the people see, however, is the righteous execution of the man 
who murdered Casandra out of jealousy for his lost inheritance. Through lies and subterfuge 
the Duke ensures that in public his honour is protected while in private he enacts their 
punishment. 
This is a play that deals in disguise. It locates itself in the slippery distinctions 
between duty and desire, private sentiment and public action, moral justice and its public 
fulfilment. Unlike today, where transparent democracy demands that every stage of the 
criminal justice process is available to public scrutiny, in Ferrara, where honour is directly 
proportional to public standing, due process is a function of public perception. This situation 
places the Duke in an invidious position. He has been harmed on two fronts – by his wife’s 
adultery and his son’s treachery – but to seek justice would be to make their betrayal public, 
damaging his reputation and thereby creating a third, even greater harm: the loss of support 
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for the legitimacy of his rule. By ordering Federico’s execution as punishment for the 
supposed murder of Casandra he delivers justice for the people and for himself, retaining his 
honour while taking revenge, and at the same time avoiding further harm in the court of 
public opinion. These ideas find expression in a seminal essay by political philosopher 
Charles Taylor, in which he writes of the causal link between personal justice and public 
perception and the damage that results when others misrecognize the fundamental precepts 
upon which our identity is built. In this ‘politics of recognition’, Taylor argues that because 
we depend upon positive reinforcement from those around us, our identity “is shaped by 
recognition or its absence” (1994, 25). In this Hegelian view, identity is bound so intimately 
with how we are perceived by others that a person “can suffer real damage, real distortion, if 
the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or 
contemptible picture of themselves”. “Misrecognition” can therefore be “a form of 
oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being” (25). Just 
as the Duke’s public standing depends upon how well his subjects view him, the health of our 
identity depends upon the quality of its public recognition. The Duke secures justice precisely 
by ensuring that his reputation remains intact, despite the revenge he takes, avoiding the risk 
of further harm. ‘Justice’ is thus a fluid concept, for it is served only when that which is 
reflected back to us from the outside matches that which we believe to be true on the inside. 
But recognition is a tricky business, for if justice is about seeing others as they see 
themselves, then it follows that we must first make a judgement about that which we see. 
Before we can ‘reflect’ something back to someone we must identify what that ‘something’ 
is. Recognition is precisely ‘political’ because, as with all understanding, it requires critical 
positions to be taken and defended about what is understood. This article argues that the 
interrelated problematics of justice, honour, harm and revenge in El castigo sin venganza can 
best be understood as a ‘politics of recognition’ in which private identity and public 
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recognition are not only inextricably linked but also direct contributors to an ultimately 
mobile conceptualization of justice. 
These lessons come to us, however, by way of an act of translation. As scholars of 
Lope’s plays we employ the depth and breadth of our combined academic knowledge in the 
study of something that was first performed in Spain over four hundred years ago. In the case 
of Punishment Without Revenge, performed on 26 September 2013 in the Ustinov Studio, 
Theatre Royal Bath, as part of the 2013-2014 Golden Age Season, the experience of Lope’s 
play comes by way of its literal translator, adaptor, director, performers, production team, 
dramaturges and academic consultants. As much for scholars in the academy as for spectators 
in the audience a politics of recognition is present here too, for our motivations are the same: 
to interrogate the play and decide for ourselves what it says today. These translational acts 
require us to make decisions about the play’s identity – in Taylor’s terms to define its “mode 
of being” and to decide for ourselves how best to recognize it – in a different time, place and 
language. Within these contexts of recognition both internal and external to the play, this 
article addresses two key questions: What does ‘misrecognition’ look like and to what extent 
does this constitute an act of ‘harm’? And how do translators enter into their own politics of 
recognition? Using as a context for analysis the author’s experience as the translator 
commissioned to provide the ‘literal’ translation on which the Theatre Royal Bath adaptation 
was based, it examines the differential ways in which the role of the literal translator has been 
characterized and how this contrasts with the complex work of recognition at translation’s 
heart. Through the illuminating discourse of the politics of recognition, and with reference to 
the concerns of El castigo sin venganza, it brings to light assumptions about the creation of 
literal translations and their bearing on the productions to which they lead. With a focus on 
the practical work of literal translation, it argues for a renewed understanding of the strategic 
decisions translators make and their creative contribution to the politics of performance. 
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Personal justice through public recognition 
Exercised by the plight of distinctive cultural traditions in modern-day multicultural society, 
Taylor maintains that the critical significance of recognition is its psychological function. 
‘Misrecognition’ happens when our identity is undervalued, misunderstood or maligned:  
 
Here injustice is rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and 
communication. Examples include cultural domination (being subjected to patterns of 
interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and are 
alien and/or hostile to one’s own); nonrecognition (being rendered invisible via the 
authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretative practices of one’s 
culture); and disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public 
cultural representations and/or in everyday life interactions). (Fraser 2014, 14) 
 
In this way, misrecognition operates through delineators of collective identity such as 
nationality, ethnicity, race and gender. Nancy Fraser gives the example of homosexual 
people: the mode of collectivity they share is that of a “disparaged sexuality”, suffering not 
only the heterosexism of societal norms that privilege heterosexual people over homosexual 
people but also the homophobia that devalues homosexuality through discrimination and 
violence (1995, 18). For Taylor, the danger is that we can internalize such characterizations 
to the extent that we see ourselves through the eyes of those who dominate us; making 
misrecognition a “grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred” (1994, 
26). At the centre of this model is an identity paradigm predicated on an ethics of the good 
life. “There is a certain way of being human”, he writes, “that is my way. I am called upon to 
live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else’s life” (30). If we each have 
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something unique to say, then for our relationship with ourselves to be ‘authentic’ it must be 
accompanied by authentic relations reflected back to us, because the principle of human 
dignity states that we are unable to flourish in our lives if the fundamental aspects of our 
identity are not properly recognized. ‘Recognition’ thus enables us to make sense of how 
social actors experience injustice because without it they cannot develop any identity at all. 
The imperative that Taylor articulates is one in which the possibility of human flourishing is 
linked inextricably to our ability to sustain instrumental contact with our inner nature. If this 
contact is absent, it is the same principle that demands that this injustice be addressed. 
Taylor’s solution is a politics of difference in which there is “an acknowledgement of 
specificity” for every individual or group misrecognized by others (39). This recognition 
accords respect to the identity of misrecognized groups in terms of their relevance in society, 
driven by the belief that “all human cultures that have animated whole societies over some 
considerable stretch of time have something important to say to all human beings” (66-7). If 
cultural domination on the basis of identity is the ‘harm’, therefore, the ‘remedy’ is some 
form of symbolic change by which formerly disrespected identities are upwardly valued in 
response – by “esteeming” the identity of others we valorize what is distinctive, recognizing 
them “as a source of valuable particularity; their traits and abilities are treated positively 
contributing to the shared projects of that community” (Rogers 2009, 189). In the 
aforementioned case of the “despised sexuality”, Taylor’s model promotes strategies such as 
gay-identity politics which re-evaluates the status of gay and lesbian identity, treating 
homosexuality “as cultural positivity with its own substantive content, much like (the 
commonsense view of) an ethnicity” (Fraser 2014, 24). At base, Taylor’s politics is 
concerned with the affirmation of particular identities and their value in society. But before 
we can upwardly valorize the particular we must first identify it as distinct from the 
universal. This requires an overarching evaluative framework against which an individual’s 
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eligibility for valorization is measured. As Fraser warns, one effect of affirmative recognition 
strategies such as valorizing gay-identity politics is to impose “a single, drastically simplified 
group identity, which denies the complexity of people’s lives, the multiplicity of their 
identifications and the cross-pulls of their various affiliations” (2001, 24). In this Derridean 
ethics of discriminatory hospitality, in other words, by imposing representative frameworks 
on heterogeneous realities, even when it is intended as a public ‘good’ recognition demands 
discrimination. 
Consider the following scene from Act One. Ricardo believes he has found the Duke 
a suitable female companion and knocks at her door. He tells her the Duke wishes to see her 
but she appears incredulous and rebukes him sarcastically:  
 
CINTIA: Dudo, 
no digo el venir contigo,  
mas el visitarme a mí 
tan gran señor y a tal hora. 
 
RICARDO: Por hacerte gran señora  
viene disfrazado así. 
 
CINTIA: Ricardo, si el mes pasado  
lo que agora me dijeras 
del Duque, me persuadieras  
que a mis puertas ha llegado; 
pues toda su mocedad  
ha vivido indignamente,  
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fábula siendo a la gente 
su viciosa libertad.      
Y como no se ha casado  
por vivir más a su gusto, 
sin mirar que fuera injusto  
ser de un bastardo heredado, 
aunque es mozo de valor 
Federico, yo creyera 
que el duque a verme viniera;  
Mas ya que como señor 
se ha venido a recoger, 
y de casar concertado, 
su hijo a Mantua ha enviado  
por Casandra, su mujer, 
no es posible que ande haciendo  
locuras de noche ya, 
cuando esperándola está 
y su entrada previniendo; 
que si en Federico fuera  
libertad, ¿qué fuera en él? (1966, 30) 
 
The Duke knows his honour depends on his good standing in the eyes of the people and 
undertakes his nocturnal activities in disguise. But Cintia is wise to his deception and in this 
devastating speech – to which she knows the Duke must listen – she reflects back to him a 
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vision of himself that contrasts sharply with how he would like to be seen, as he himself 
acknowledges: 
 
Basta, que oí del papel  
de aquella primera dama 
el estado de mi fama: 
bien claro me hablaba en él. 
¿Que escuche me persüades  
la segunda? Pues no ignores 
que no quieren los señores  
oír tan claras verdades (34) 
 
Cintia’s rejection is a thinly-veiled critique of the Duke’s lascivious lifestyle but she also 
captures the conflicting politics of recognition in which the Duke is mired. As a famed 
libertine his intentions are obvious. But she also knows that his presence on the eve of his 
wedding holds a much greater significance, for the very security of his reign is at stake; if he 
does not relinquish his debauched ways and provide a legitimate heir the people will perceive 
a vacuum of power and rise up against him. Her words do him harm – as the Duke observes, 
“Quien escucha, oye su daño” (31). But they do so not just because they misrecognize the 
fundamental traits of honour, valour and respect he holds true for himself but because they 
suggest the wages of misrecognition on a much larger, geopolitical scale. For the Duke, 
recognition and its absence are political precisely because every action he contemplates, from 
taking a wife to taking revenge, must be risk-assessed against the self-same politics of public 
perception to which he is subject. 
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Nowhere is this strategic dimension clearer than when Federico and Casandra’s affair 
is revealed in Act Three, when each of the Duke’s actions is touched by his acute knowledge 
of the ineluctable power of public perception. If he takes revenge their adultery will be 
revealed and his honour will be ruined. And yet if the affront of their affair goes unpunished 
the injustice of their actions will persist: 
 
¿Cómo sabré con prudencia  
verdad que no me disfame  
con los testigos que llame? 
Ni así la podré saber;  
porque ¿quién ha de querer  
decir verdad tan infame? 
¿Mas, de qué sirve informarme?.  
pues esto no se dijera 
de un hijo, cuando no fuera  
verdad que pudo infamarme.  
Castigarle no es vengarme, 
ni se venga el que castiga, 
ni esto a información me obliga; 
que mal que el honor estraga,  
no es menester que se haga,         
porque basta que se diga. (105) 
 
Knowing that to speak their betrayal is to destroy his honour, he must gain proof of their 
affair without making it public: 
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No es menester más testigo: 
confesaron de una vez; 
prevenid, pues sois jüez, 
honra, sentencia y castigo. 
Pero de tal suerte sea 
que no se infame mi nombre; 
que en público siempre a un hombre       
queda alguna cosa fea. 
Y no es bien que hombre nacido  
sepa que yo estoy sin honra, 
siendo enterrar la deshonra  
como no haberla tenido. (112) 
 
At every step of this calculated revenge, the Duke is painfully aware that the tenuousness of 
honour lies in the fact that it is subject to the vicissitudes of public opinion. When he 
exclaims, “¡Ay, honor, fiero enemigo! / ¿Quién fue el primero que dio / tu ley al mundo, y 
que fuese / mujer quien en sí tuviese / tu valor, y el hombre no? /”, it is not so much in 
woman that honour lies but in the other more generally (114). The punishment he devises 
must be viewed as a just action on the part of the State:  
 
Cielos,  
hoy se ha de ver en mi casa  
no más de vuestro castigo.  
Alzad la divina vara. 
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No es venganza de mi agravio, 
que yo no quiero tomarla 
en vuestra ofensa, y de un hijo  
ya fuera bárbara hazaña. 
Éste ha de ser un castigo  
vuestro no más, porque valga 
para que perdone el cielo  
el rigor por la templanza.  
Seré padre, y no marido,  
dando la justicia santa 
a un pecado sin vergüenza 
un castigo sin venganza. 
Esto disponen las leyes         
del honor, y que no haya  
publicidad en mi afrenta, 
con que se doble mi infamia. 
Quien en público castiga,  
dos veces su honor infama, 
pues después que le ha perdido,  
por el mundo le dilata (115.) 
 
In this politics of recognition, he who punishes in public loses his honour twice. But this 
politics also dictates that the Duke’s honour will remain intact for as long as the people 
recognize him as honourable. What the Marquis describes as “el castigo / sin venganza /” 
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(120) is a special brand of personal justice in which the Duke successfully negotiates both the 
opportunities and constraints of recognition. 
 
The translator’s recognition 
When it comes to Lope’s theatre on the English-speaking stage, what do these mechanics of 
recognition illuminate about the role of the translator? In what sense is translation an act of 
recognition, and, in the case of the so-called ‘literal’ translator, what is it that makes it 
political? At first glance, the literal translator’s job description appears distinctly a-political: 
to translate a play written originally in a foreign language so that it can be adapted for 
performance. This work of adaptation is often carried out by an experienced writer who 
transforms the literal into living theatre. When such adaptors do not speak the language of the 
original they seek as close a reflection of the play as possible. Much of the language used by 
theatre professionals to describe literal translation suggests a process aimed primarily at 
transparency, as “an information map” (Katherine Mendelsohn), giving a “fractured x-ray of 
the play” (Howard Brenton) and “a very accurate picture in English” (David Eldridge) of a 
text written originally in another language.i In an interview in May 2011 Alan Ayckbourn 
discussed his adaptation of Chekhov’s Uncle Vanya:  
 
I got a literal translation of the play from Vera Liber, a lady I’d worked with before on 
Ostrovsky’s The Forest. This was written as faithfully to the original as possible and 
is quite nice and simple. Vera Liber writes without any judgement as far as I can see; 
she’s also quite passionate about the precise meanings of words. (Murgatroyd 2011)  
 
Simplicity, faithfulness, the absence of judgement: this is the apparent task of the literal 
translator. But the paradoxical intention Ayckbourn also outlines is that of advocating for the 
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words of the foreign text – making a passionate case for certain meanings over others – while 
suspending personal investment in the process. The question we must ask is whether it is 
possible to impute meanings to the words of a foreign text while also writing, in Ayckbourn’s 
words, “without any judgement”. It is at this point that we can look to the politics of 
recognition for answers. 
In the context of Castigo, a play which has been performed in English a number of 
times, the first level of recognition the literal translator enters into is one of belief: that by 
undertaking a fresh translation the play will produce something new to say to us. For George 
Steiner this is the ‘hermeneutic trust’ we place in the text: “All understanding”, he writes, 
“and the demonstrative statement of understanding which is translation, starts with an act of 
trust” (1998, 312). If literal translation is about ‘understanding’ the foreign text then the 
translation process starts when the translator invests psychologically in the belief that there is 
something in the play that continues to demand to be understood. My own translation 
process, for example, starts with attempting to understand what the characters themselves are 
most invested in. When I have access to an electronic version of the playtext-for-translation, 
which I did in this case, I use a software-based word-count algorithm to rank the frequency of 
every word. I remove proper nouns, articles, determiners and quantifiers, separating the 
semantically load-bearing content from the linguistic bricks and mortar. This sifting process 
is always extremely illuminating: by categorizing Lope’s words in this way we gain a 
panoramic vision of his characters’ chief concerns. My analysis revealed that issues of 
justice, honour, harm and revenge are not just salient themes but a constant preoccupation. 
Agravio, and its related forms agravios, agraviado, agraviarse and desagravio, appear on 17 
separate occasions; ofensa and its related forms appear 14 times; daño and related forms a 
further five times. Justicia, and related forms, appears 12 times while venganza and related 
forms appears 16 times. Whether we conceive of these ideas as ‘injury’, ‘harm’, ‘justice’ or 
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‘revenge’, they are repeated again and again, in morphological derivation or grammatical 
inflection. But by far the most frequent word does not have anything to do with questions of 
harm or revenge. Amor appears 75 times, followed by dios, 41, and alma, 37. Quiero is 
uttered 27 separate times; valor, 27; razón, 22; honor, 21. Over and above their perception of 
harm and desire for retribution, these are characters concerned with bigger things. Certainly, 
the theme of vengeance is integral to the plot, but I find the word-count analysis urges us to 
remain open to other measures of significance. 
When I turn to the practical work of translation itself, I look for clues to each of the 
play’s relationships, to the dynamics of power that unfurl and extend themselves through the 
language of the speeches. Consider the following from Act Two; Casandra is now married 
and here she speaks with Federico for the first time since she has learned of the Duke’s 
infidelity: 
 
FEDERICO Mi señora, 
dé vuestra Alteza la mano 
a su esclavo. 
 
CASANDRA ¿Tú en el suelo? 
Conde, no te humilles tanto, 
que te llamaré Excelencia. 
 
FEDERICO Será de mi amor agravio; 
ni me pienso levantar 
sin ella. 
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CASANDRA Aquí están mis brazos. 
¿Qué tienes? ¿Qué has visto en mí? 
Parece que estás temblando. 
¿Sabes ya lo que te quiero? (1966, 67) 
 
Here, my hermeneutic trust concerned Casandra’s use of the informal form of address. 
Throughout Act One exchanges between Casandra and Federico are characterized by their 
rigid formality and copious honorifics. This exchange in Act Two, however, comes after 
Casandra confides in Lucrecia that the Duke has returned to his libidinous ways. When she 
encounters Federico and says, “¿Tú en el suelo? / Conde, no te humilles tanto, /”, this is the 
first time she employs the second person pronoun. In translating this scene it was my belief 
that it is here that the air between them changes. By this stage the audience knows their 
mutual attraction – both Batín and Lucrecia have been made well aware of their masters’ 
feelings – but they have not yet spoken openly about their desires. I investigated the grammar 
of their exchanges in more detail. At this point, Federico is in a miserable state. Having asked 
Batín to give them privacy, Casandra scolds Federico for his apparent bitterness over the loss 
of his inheritance. The audience knows that the real cause of Federico’s distress is the 
impossible love he has for his stepmother. It is in his response to her rebuke that he himself 
first uses the second person singular: 
 
Comenzando vuestra Alteza  
riñéndome, acaba en llanto  
su discurso, que pudiera  
en el más duro peñasco  
imprimir dolor. Qué es esto? 
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Sin duda que me ha mirado, 
por hijo de quien la ofende;  
pero yo la desengaño  
que no parezca hijo suyo  
para tan injustos casos.  
Esto persuadido ansí,  
de mi tristeza, me espanto, 
que la atribuyas, señora,  
a pensamientos tan bajos. (70) 
 
Yet he does not reveal his true feelings and continues to address her as “vuestra Alteza” until 
much later in the Act. When he finally uses this construction for the last time, Casandra is 
attempting to establish the cause of his inexorable sadness. In response to her questioning he 
replies, “En tanto mal / responderé a vuestra Alteza / que es mi tristeza inmortal./” (84). His 
foolish qualms, he goes on to say, are his to bear alone. Casandra’s solution is to tell him the 
story of Antiochus, who so loved his stepmother that he fell into a deep malaise. No doctor 
could establish the cause. But wise Herostratus knew that such an illness was a poison that 
lay somewhere between the lip and the heart. He called for the women of the palace and took 
Antiochus’s pulse as they passed. When the stepmother arrived, Herostratus felt the 
quickening of Antiochus’s pulse and knew at once she was the cause of his pain. The story 
enables Casandra to ask Federico directly if he suffers the same problem and with this 
singular device they are able to bring their feelings into the open. From then on, Federico’s 
need for formality dissipates. My understanding of their romantic dynamic was predicated on 
the belief that the future course of their affair from this point onwards – when Federico here 
admits his love and no longer addresses her as ‘highness’ – was foreshadowed when 
  17 
Casandra first addresses Federico informally and the emotional distance between them starts 
to close.  
My literal indeed attempted to deliver clarity, precision and maximum objectivity – 
“You on the ground? / Count, do not humble yourself so much; / for I will call you 
“Excellency” /”. I provided a footnote in which I discussed the issue of grandeeships and the 
Nueva Recopilación de las Leyes in which it states that no one may use the term Exceléncia 
unless they are Grande (Vega 1966, 129). Having been invited by the Theatre Royal Bath to 
provide academic support during the rehearsals period, I advocated personally for the 
significance of the change in register with the director and actors, affirming both my belief in 
its presence in the text and my evaluation of its dramatic value. As we are reminded with 
Taylor’s paradigm, affirmative recognition strategies start from an assumption: that a kernel 
of mystery exists externally to us. In order to recognize it a certain essentialism must be 
enacted, for, being external, we must employ evaluative methods in order to discern what it is 
we wish to recognize. Even when undertaken for positive reasons recognition requires a 
certain perspicacious discrimination. In the case of Federico and Casandra, by affirming that 
there was something ‘there’ to be recognized, and then by articulating for the director and 
actors precisely what that something was – in this case the T-V distinction and its portentous 
role in their affair – I submitted their exchange to a process of critical evaluation. By 
advocating for an active recognition of that which I myself had already actively recognized, I 
was, in effect, as much creating, as I was calling attention to, the performative value of their 
words. 
 
The hermeneutics of recognition 
To make sense of this act of performative creation, we must further explore the notion of 
hermeneutic trust. Historically, hermeneutics was concerned with the exegetical problem of 
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how to understand a text, beginning with its ‘intention’ and proceeding on the basis of what it 
‘says’. Recent approaches, however, address the more fundamental problem of the person 
doing the understanding. As Paul Ricoeur observes, “every reading of a text always takes 
place within a community, a tradition, or a living current of thought, all of which display 
presuppositions and exigencies – regardless of how closely a reading may be tied to the quid, 
to ‘that in view of which’ the text was written” (2004, 3). In the spoken realm discourse 
involves someone saying something to someone else, but in the written domain symbols are 
not confined to their original creator. With the passage of time the author disappears and a 
work’s addressees become unclear – it is thus an open-ended communication whose 
‘addressees’ are limitless. Separated from the original communicative ‘event’, the modern 
day reader is distanced in time and space from the text in its past context of production and 
reception. This hermeneutic ‘distanciation’ creates what Richard Kearney describes as the 
“open horizon of interpretations” through which meaning is liberated from its original range 
of reference and becomes ‘autonomous’, inviting a multiplicity of readings (2007, 31). As a 
result, readers are bound in a circle of competing historical intersubjectivities in which the 
worlds of the original author and their text become inseparable from the time and place from 
which we read them. To interpret meaning within this circle is thus “to arrive in the middle of 
an exchange which has already begun and in which we seek to orient ourselves in order to 
make some sense of it” (5). 
This distance need not risk paralysis, for we can make an imaginative leap into the 
hermeneutic abyss and offer up our best ‘guess’ at the text that stands before us. The task of 
such leap, Ricoeur explains: 
 
is to conquer a remoteness, a distance between the past cultural epoch to which the 
text belongs and the interpreter himself. By overcoming this distance, by making 
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himself contemporary with the text, the exegete can appropriate its meaning to 
himself: foreign, he makes it familiar, that is, he makes it his own. (2004, 16) 
 
Given the autonomy of the text’s meaning in respect of this circular distanciation, the goal of 
hermeneutics is not to recover what is lost to the vagaries of time and space but to appropriate 
meaning to ourselves, making contemporary that which is past and rendering familiar that 
which is foreign. What we appropriate is neither the intention of the author nor a secret 
design behind the text but “the proposal of a mode of being-in-the-world, which the text 
discloses in front of itself by means of its non-ostensive references” (1981, 192). Wolfgang 
Iser explains this idea through the example of two people gazing at the stars. Both are faced 
with the same blanket of stellar phenomena but while one focuses on the plough the other 
sees the image of the dipper. The manner in which we interpret a text is therefore given not 
by the text itself but in its meeting with the mind of its reader (1972, 286). It is for this reason 
that what we appropriate is never the ‘essence’ of a text but the proposed world we inhabit 
when we project our interpretation upon it. When Ricoeur writes that hermeneutics is “self-
understanding by means of understanding others”, he suggests that by studying the mechanics 
of this interpretive proposal, we learn as much about our own subjectivity before the text as 
we do about the text itself (2004, 16). 
 
The hermeneutics of (literal) translation 
As ‘readers’ of Lope’s play, we are at a distance: from the ‘event’ of its language, themes 
ideas and characters in the time and place of its production and reception. Whether adaptor, 
actor, director, scholar or literal translator, when approaching the play from this critical 
distance our task is to understand. To do so we inhabit the play – we furnish it with our 
readings, we project ideas onto its empty walls and we remodel its foreign architecture to 
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respect familiar tastes. As with Taylor’s politics of recognition, something external demands 
to be recognized. We enter into a translational hermeneutics precisely when this demand 
requires us to project ourselves into a world of potential meanings. Taylor’s politics is about 
turning the fruit of this imaginative projection into affirmative action, actively valorizing and 
upwardly advocating our response to what we read. As with recognition, hermeneutics is at 
base normative because the reader’s distanciation from the objects of interpretation requires 
judgements to be made. In their reliance on deliberative gestures of critical evaluation, 
recognition and hermeneutics coincide, for they each require positions to be taken, over the 
meaning of what is perceived and how best to attribute value to it.  
What do these insights add to our understanding of literal translation? We can say first 
that the process of writing a literal translation is as partial an exercise as any other form of 
interpretation. Its goal may indeed be to communicate as clearly as possible the full range of 
dramatic possibilities within the foreign text, to open up rather than foreclose its potential for 
adaptation to the stage. But from a hermeneutic perspective the inevitable distance of space 
and time that separates the translator from the text he or she is tasked with understanding and 
the critical judgement required to bridge it also mean that literal translation is an entirely 
purposeful act. In a roundtable discussion at the Gate Theatre in 1994, Joseph Farrell recalls a 
similar scenario:  
 
I was once asked to do a literal translation and I refused; it wasn’t just arrogance, 
there were other considerations as well. I really don’t know precisely what a literal 
translation might mean, because at each point you must be making an interpretation; 
you’ve got to be deciding obscure points, thinking this is possibly what this means, or 
this is the meaning that fits into the overall context of the play, or what do we know 
about the overall ideas of this man and what do we pick up from the language itself? 
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[...] It is his/her responsibility to try and get as close as possible to what is being said 
in the original play; to provide a product which isn’t too closely married into the 
expectations of the audience, but rather something that will challenge those 
expectations. (Johnston 1996, 284-5)  
 
Literal translations occupy a curious ontological space somewhere between texts in their own 
right and texts-as-yet-unfulfilled. They are created not to enjoy an existence of their own but 
to give life to a different text – the performance text – that crafts the foreign playtext into a 
work of theatre for production on the local stage. The destiny of a literal, therefore, is 
fulfilled precisely in the condition of having no destiny of its own. It is for this reason that the 
practice of literal translation is often dismissed as automatic, as a transparent window onto 
the foreign play or the uncomplicated transfer of meaning between two stages. As David 
Johnston argues: 
 
At the heart of the creation of the playable translation is a dramaturgical remoulding, 
because such a remoulding creates the vehicle which transports – the root meaning of 
the very to translate – the audience into the experience of the play. In other words, 
rather than giving new form to an already known meaning, translation for the stage is 
about giving form to a potential for performance. (2013, 58) 
 
Johnston most recently translated and adapted Lope’s La dama boba, which was also 
produced by the Theatre Royal Bath in 2013. Here, he focuses specifically on translation for 
the stage, as opposed to literal translation which does not purport to yield a performable text. 
He describes such a form of stage-orientated translation as above all a process of writing for 
actors. But there are lessons here too about the practice of literal translation, for at every step 
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of the way the literal translator makes decisions about how to understand the play, to explain 
it in another language, and, as Farrell recognizes, to consider the expectations of those on the 
receiving end of its curiously unfulfilled destiny. It is the literal translator’s knowledge of 
these expectations that determines its shape, for a literal translation writes for the future: for 
the adaptor who will transform it, for the director who will bring its vision to life and for the 
actors who will embody such a vision. A literal translation is as much a work of 
prognostication as it is a process of precision, for the translator must imagine the needs of a 
play’s adaptor and director and craft a way to meet them – simultaneously interpreting the 
play in its original language, while also interpreting how it will be used in translation. 
In my own literal the traces of this hermeneutics of expectation were evident as much 
in form as in content. While many editions of the play provide line numbers on every fifth 
line, I wanted the literal to offer maximum flexibility by displaying numbers at every line. If 
the adaptor Meredith Oakes had a question about a particular term I wanted her to be able to 
reference it efficiently in her communications with me. I submitted the literal alongside a 
copy of the original play, which I reformatted to follow the same line numbering so that 
individual lines in the literal could be cross-referenced with their corresponding lines in the 
Spanish original. What I wanted was to provide as transparent a vision as possible: not of 
Lope’s play, but of my own engagement with each and every line. I tracked versification 
changes and colour-coded these in both the Spanish companion text and the literal. I 
synthesized the secondary literature into a series of explanatory footnotes that showed points 
of consensus and disagreement in the scholarship, alongside independent research of my own. 
When Ricardo, for example, acts as the local tour guide on the Duke’s clandestine visit to the 
town and describes the “imposible sufrillo” (1966, 37) of the seraphim-like woman who has 
“Un cierto maridillo / que toma y no da lugar” (39), I discussed how the -illo suffix deviated 
from the standard to produce a playful, transgressive effect. While Meredith was writing her 
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adaptation I fielded queries, undertook further research and clarified problem areas. I advised 
on the Romance verse form and discussed its role in Lope’s theatre, its semiotic significance 
and function in the play. We discussed numerous historical terms and I recommended various 
ways in which a particular expression might be read. 
To recall the notion of the literal as an “information map” to the original foreign play, 
even at the subtle level of individual word-choice the literal translator must enter into a 
hermeneutics of purposeful meaning-making, for multiple possibilities present themselves, 
options must be weighed and decisions must be made if it is to fulfil its remit to provide as 
accurate and as detailed a ‘map’ as possible for its adaptor. The following examples are taken 
from Act Three and trace the Duke’s inner turmoil and subsequent crisis of revenge when he 
learns of Federico and Casandra’s affair. The literal I submitted to the Theatre Royal Bath is 
shown alongside Meredith Oakes’s adaptation and two previously published translations. 
  
Lope de Vega 
1966 
Maitland 2013 Oakes 2013 Booty 1961 Edwards 1999 
(1).  
¿Cómo sabré 
con prudencia/ 
verdad que no 
me disfame/ 
con los testigos 
que llame? (105) 
 
How will I 
know with 
prudence 
a truth that does 
not defame 
me/damage my 
reputation 
with the 
witnesses that I 
 
But how can I, 
with care and 
prudence, 
Find the truth 
without 
exposing 
My reputation in 
the process? 
(81) 
 
How can I 
prudently 
discover the 
truth? For no 
man would dare 
to reveal this 
horror to me. I 
must tread 
warily, since any 
 
How can I, then, 
be sure that 
I learn the truth 
and not expect 
The witnesses I 
call to draw 
Attention to the 
full extent 
Of my ignoble 
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call? whispered 
reports against 
my son 
dishonour my 
name also. (270) 
fall? (251) 
(2.) 
Sin tormento 
han 
confesado…/ 
pero sin 
tormento no;/ 
que claro está 
que soy yo/ 
a quien el 
tormento han 
dado. (112) 
 
Without 
torment/torture 
they have 
confessed… 
but without 
torment/torture 
no; 
for it is clear 
that I am the one 
to whom they 
have given 
torment/torture. 
 
They’ve 
confessed 
everything, 
without torture.  
Without torture, 
did I say?  
No, for I’m the 
person they  
Have tortured 
almost past 
endurance. (87-
8) 
 
They have 
confessed all 
without the rack, 
for they have me 
upon it/ No 
more is needed. 
They have 
confessed. (273) 
 
They have 
Confessed their 
sin without the 
need 
To torture them. 
But who can say 
There is no 
torture here if I 
Am forced to 
listen to this foul 
Confession? 
(258) 
(3). 
Que aunque 
parece defensa/ 
de la honra el 
desagravio,/ 
no deja de ser 
agravio/ 
 
For even though 
[redress] seems 
a defence 
of honour, 
it does not stop 
being an 
 
For even though 
redress appears 
To be defending 
honour, it 
Can’t remove 
the stain from it, 
 
Once the offense 
is known, 
nothing can 
erase it from the 
minds of men. 
(273) 
 
For it is not 
enough for any 
man 
To cleanse his 
honour, when 
others are 
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cuando se sabe 
la ofensa. (105) 
insult/offence 
when the 
offence is 
known. 
Once news 
reaches people’s 
ears. (88) 
Prepared to 
speak of it 
forever.  
(258) 
 
What is striking is not so much that individual words I suggested – “reputation”, “torture”, 
“redress” – made their way directly to the stage but the degree of individuality that 
surrounded their translation in the first instance. In the case of tormento in (2.), which I 
offered as “torment/torture”, my rationale for a less ambiguous, unequivocal secondary 
choice was not only the fact that “torture” and “confession” share the same semantic field, 
but when speaking of the horror of having to spy on the very people who have betrayed him, 
“torture” functions like a transitive verb: what they do to the Duke is like an active injury. 
When he says “¿Cómo sabré con prudencia / verdad que no me disfame /” in (1.), numerous 
translations such as “slander”, “malign” or “slur” would have been logical but instead I 
provided a close translation, “a truth that does not / defame / me” and an alternative, “a truth 
that does not / damage / my reputation”. Lope’s text itself did not demand such elucidation; 
unlike other speeches the syntactical logics of this line is relatively easy to follow and yet I 
had offered something more. In addition to precision I had offered a more interpretive 
alternative – I had attempted to understand and to communicate the fruit of this 
understanding to my reader. At stake in (3.) is the play’s central paradox of revenge: injustice 
must be dealt with if one’s honour is to be restored; but by taking revenge one makes 
injustice public and suffers the injustice of losing one’s honour all over again. In desagravio 
the full binding force of this paradox is present in the -des prefix and its suggestion of the 
deliberate undoing of insult, grievance or offence. The Booty translation, for example, avoids 
this paradox entirely while the Edwards translation, which speaks of “cleansing” the Duke’s 
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honour, misses out on the reparative, recuperational nuance it implies. Having invested this 
belief in the dramatic significance of the -des prefix, with “redress” I was determined not to 
transform Lope’s evocative noun into a verbal gloss. 
As Ricoeur maintains, hermeneutics starts where there is a mystery to be solved. For 
translators, the bulk of this mystery resides within the text-for-translation. But for the literal 
translator specifically, the task of translation itself creates a second set of mysteries, for the 
translation is destined to be ‘translated’ again by its adaptor. At every stage I knew that the 
words I was writing would themselves be examined as intimately as I had examined those of 
Lope’s original. With this in mind, one of the final stages of my process is to attempt to put 
myself in the shoes of the adaptor who would use my words to craft the performance text, to 
imagine into the future the ways in which my text would be read – to interpret, in other 
words, the mysteries my own words could create. By projecting forwards into the work of 
adaptation and looking backwards at my literal, I revisited my own choice of words and 
searched for the possibility of unwarranted ambiguities. Towards the end of Act Three, for 
example, when the Duke dispatches Federico to kill the supposed assassin, Federico replies, 
“Ten la espada, y aquí aguarda; /” (2961). In my literal, I translated this as “Have [take] the 
sword, and here await; /” in an attempt both to remain close to Lope’s Spanish while also 
heading off any undesirable departures from my use of ‘have’. 
When tracked in this way, literal translation is far from a detached linguistic 
transaction. In what Kathleen Mountjoy (Jeffs) calls the “unfinished linguistic bridge” 
between the original and its dramatic presencing (2007, 76-7), it is a creative process of 
decision-making and discernment on the part of the literal translator, who takes their place 
alongside the adaptor and director as figures charged with bringing meaning to the play. 
Much has been written about the lack of symbolic and financial status accorded to literary 
translators. But as the Encyclopedia of Literary Translation into English observes, “this is no 
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doubt partly the making of literal translators themselves. Perhaps some of them, too self-
effacing, undervalue their own contribution. This attitude obstructs the efforts of those who 
do fight for recognition and improved rates of pay” (2000, 858). With these words we return 
to the politics of recognition, for by focusing on the literal translator’s contribution to the 
process of meaning-making in the theatre, perhaps the time has come to seek recognition, not 
symbolic or financial, but of the strategic politics the hermeneutic work of literal translation 
necessarily entails. What we gain from the politics of recognition is the insight that the 
accordance of putative value to any object of our perception is a tactical move: it requires us 
to evaluate what we see and to make a judgement about the extent to which it is worthy of 
valorization. From hermeneutics we learn that every act of understanding requires an 
interpretive gesture that implicates the interpreter directly in the texture of his or her own 
interpretation – everything is mediated by the interpreter’s response to what they perceive 
and how they understand it. To valorize the contribution of literal translators in this way is to 
recognize first that literal translations cannot give unmediated access to the foreign-language 
plays on which they are based, for there is no transparent lens through which such plays can 
be viewed except through the subjective gaze the translator’s interpretation demands. But it is 
also to acknowledge that as with any act of recognition, to valorize literal translation requires 
submitting it to a process of evaluation. A literal can and should be subjected to a process of 
perspicacious interrogation by its users – to question its value, not as a transparent window 
but as a means towards the creation of new and living theatre through its adaptor. Ricoeur 
always intended for our hermeneutic guesses to be tested, to be put into practice and called 
into scrutiny, for a literal is only one possible interpretation out of many. In the case of the 
theatre of Lope de Vega, this recognition not only liberates literal translation from the 
constraints of its impossible representational burden but also creates the need for fresh 
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translations, written in new places, in new times, by different translators, undertaking 
different guesses and offering up new potentials for performance on the stage. 
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